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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether appellate courts must parse “questions that present elements both factual and legal”
into their factual and legal components, so that all
factual findings can be reviewed for clear error, or
whether, as the First Circuit ruled, they may review
such questions as a whole along a “continuum” of
deference, where the degree of deference given to the
district court is of “variable exactitude.”
2. Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits
prison officials from denying necessary medical
treatment to a prisoner for non-medical reasons,
such as security concerns.
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Michelle Kosilek, plaintiff-appellee below.
Respondent is the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction, defendant-appellant
below. The current Commissioner is Carol Higgins
O’Brien. This suit originally named Michael T.
Maloney, the Commissioner of the Massachusetts
Department of Correction at the time the complaint
was filed.
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1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
________________________
Petitioner Michelle Kosilek respectfully petitions
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the en banc court of appeals (Pet.
App. 1a-109a) is reported at 774 F.3d 63. The threejudge panel decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
110a-219a) is reported at 740 F.3d 733. The district
court’s decision granting injunctive relief following a
bench trial (Pet. App. 220a-344a) is reported at 889
F. Supp. 2d 190. An earlier decision of the district
court following a previous bench trial (Pet. App.
345a-432a) is reported at 221 F. Supp. 156.
JURISDICTION
The en banc court of appeals entered judgment on
December 16, 2014. Pet. App. 3a. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent provisions of the Eighth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52 are reprinted in the Appendix, infra, at 433a-434a.
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INTRODUCTION
This case involves the First Circuit’s review of the
district court’s fact-driven determination, following a
28-day bench trial, that the Massachusetts Department of Correction (“DOC”) violated the Eighth
Amendment by refusing to provide petitioner
Michelle Kosilek with necessary medical treatment
that had been recommended by the DOC’s own doctors. A panel of the First Circuit affirmed, but the
court granted a petition for rehearing, and a 3-2 majority of the en banc court reversed. In so doing, the
en banc court did not identify a single error of law,
nor did it declare any of the district court’s factual
findings clearly erroneous.
The en banc majority was able to achieve this reversal only by invoking its “degree-of-deference continuum,” a standard of review of its own design that
is not found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and that is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents
and the precedents of other circuits. Under its “continuum,” the First Circuit applies a standard of review of “variable exactitude” to any issue that has
both legal and factual components, rather than
breaking such issues down and then applying de novo or clear error review to each legal or factual component, as appropriate.
The First Circuit’s continuum approach allows it to
conduct its review without ever expressly stating
what standard of review is warranted—or what
standard of review it is applying. And that is precisely what happened here: By invoking its continuum of deference, the en banc majority of the First
Circuit gave itself free reign to disregard the district
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court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, to independently review and reweigh the evidence presented at trial, and to reach conclusions
based on the evidence that were contrary to the findings made by the district court, without ever holding
that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Because the First Circuit’s continuum approach
differs from that of other circuits and is untethered
to this Court’s precedents, see infra pp. 15-21—and
because it impacts not only this case, but potentially
every civil case in the First Circuit for which there is
an evidentiary record, see, e.g., S. Kingstown Sch.
Comm. v. Joanna S., 773 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir.
2014) (invoking continuum in IDEA case); Braunstein v. McCabe, 571 F.3d 108, 124 (1st Cir. 2009)
(invoking continuum in bankruptcy case)—this Court
should grant certiorari to address it.
Additionally, the Court should grant certiorari to
consider whether prison officials may, consistent
with the Eighth Amendment, refuse to provide necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons.
The First Circuit held here that the DOC could constitutionally deny medical treatment to Ms. Kosilek
based on security concerns. This conclusion is inconsistent with the Constitution, with this Court’s precedents, and with the holdings of other circuits. The
Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials a duty both to provide adequate medical care and to protect prisoners from violence while incarcerated. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Prison
officials are not entitled to choose between these two
constitutional obligations. Instead, to comply with
the Eighth Amendment, they must find a way to ensure both safety and adequate medical care for all
inmates.

4
STATEMENT
This petition culminates more than 20 years of litigation and two trials addressing whether DOC officials have violated Ms. Kosilek’s rights under the
Eighth Amendment by failing to provide adequate
treatment for her severe gender identity disorder
(“GID”), a condition that both parties agree is a “serious medical need.” Pet. App. 43a.
Ms. Kosilek entered DOC custody in 1992. Pet.
App. 346a. By that time, she had long self-identified
as a woman who was trapped inside a man’s body.
Id. at 345a. Throughout her time in custody, Ms.
Kosilek steadfastly continued to pursue expression of
her female identity. She also sought medical treatment for her GID from prison officials. When they
refused, she filed suit. Id. at 346a.
A.

Kosilek I

During her first bench trial (Kosilek I), Ms. Kosilek
sought treatment consistent with the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care (the “Standards of Care”).
Pet. App. 347a. The Standards of Care establish a
progressive “triadic treatment sequence,” calling for
(1) hormone therapy, (2) “real-life experience of living as a member of the opposite sex” for at least one
year, and, for some suffering from GID, (3) sex reassignment surgery (“SRS”). Id. at 299a, 364a.
The district court found that the Standards of Care
represent the “prudent professional standards,” Pet.
App. 428a, that are “regularly relied upon by experts” to treat GID, id. at 381a,1 and that, by not folOther courts have reached the same conclusion. See De’lonta
v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522-23 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Stand1
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lowing these standards and instead providing only
generalized counseling to Ms. Kosilek, the DOC had
failed to meet Ms. Kosilek’s serious medical need.
Id. at 418a. The court declined to impose an injunction, however, finding that, until that time, the DOC
Commissioner did not have actual knowledge that
Ms. Kosilek faced a substantial risk of serious harm.
Id. at 352a-353a. But, because the court’s opinion
“put [the Commissioner] on notice” of this risk, id.,
the court also made clear that it expected DOC officials to provide adequate care to Ms. Kosilek going
forward. Id. at 427a. If they did not, the court
warned, Ms. Kosilek likely would be entitled to injunctive relief. Id. at 355a.
B.

The DOC’s Post-Kosilek I Conduct

After Kosilek I, the DOC revised its GID-treatment
policy, but it still refused to provide prisoners suffering from GID with treatments recommended by the
DOC’s medical provider, the University of Massachusetts Correctional Health Program (“UMass”),
unless the treatments were approved by the DOC Director of Health Services and the Commissioner.
Pet. App. 268a-269a. This made GID the only medi-

ards of Care . . . are the generally accepted protocols for the
treatment of GID.”); Sundstrom v. Frank, No. 06-C-112, 2007
WL 3046240, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2007) (“[T]he Standards
of Care . . . are accepted worldwide, and represent the consensus of professionals regarding the psychiatric, medical and surgical management of GID.”); Wilson v. Phoenix House, 978
N.Y.S.2d 748, 764 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“The course of treatment for Gender Identity Disorder generally followed in the
medical community is governed by the ‘Standards of Care’
. . . .”).
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cal condition for which treatment decisions were not
left to medical professionals. Id. at 269a.
UMass hired GID specialist Dr. David Seil to evaluate Ms. Kosilek. Dr. Seil diagnosed Ms. Kosilek
with severe GID and, pursuant to the Standards of
Care, recommended estrogen therapy, electrolysis for
facial hair removal, and access to female clothing
and makeup. Pet. App. 269a-270a. He also recommended a reevaluation after one year, once Ms.
Kosilek completed the second step of the triadic sequence, to determine whether she also required SRS.
Id. at 270a. The DOC responded to this evaluation
by terminating Dr. Seil. Id. at 271a.2
The DOC nonetheless implemented certain of
Dr. Seil’s recommendations, including hormone therapy and providing female clothing, but only after receiving a written report from the Superintendent of
MCI Norfolk indicating that he did not foresee any
security problems with these treatments. Pet. App.
272a-273a. Ms. Kosilek’s increasing feminization resulted in no security incidents. Id. at 273a & n.9.
But progress slowed in 2004, when Kathleen
Dennehy was named the new DOC Commissioner.
Pet. App. 273a. As the district court found, “Dennehy began taking a series of actions intended to delay,
and ultimately deny,” Ms. Kosilek’s prescribed medical care, including cancelling Ms. Kosilek’s scheduled
electrolysis treatment without justification. Id. at
273a-274a.

The DOC also terminated its initial litigation expert in 2000
after he recommended that Ms. Kosilek’s treatment follow the
Standards of Care. Pet. App. 271a.

2

7
Meanwhile, UMass sought a new GID specialist to
evaluate Ms. Kosilek for SRS.3 It chose the Fenway
Community Health Center of Massachusetts—“the
foremost referral center in New England” for individuals with GID. Pet. App. 274a. But, in what the
district court found to be an “unprecedented” move,
the DOC independently retained Cynthia Osborne, a
licensed social worker in the Johns Hopkins University Department of Psychiatry, to peer review Fenway Health’s medical recommendation. Id. at 274a276a.
At this point, the district court’s findings of fact
and the First Circuit’s account of the facts diverge
significantly. The district court found that Osborne
was hired by the DOC because of her known beliefs
that (1) SRS was rarely medically necessary and (2)
an inmate, by virtue of incarceration, could never
have the real-life experience that is a prerequisite to
SRS under the Standards of Care. Pet. App. 276a277a. The district court also found that the entire
Johns Hopkins psychiatry department, including
Osborne, was “substantially influenced” by the department chair, Dr. Paul McHugh, who “was wellknown for his strongly held view that sex reassignment surgery is ‘religiously abhorrent.’” Id. at 276a.
On this evidence, the district court found that “Osborne’s known positions and foreseeable advice that
Kosilek should not be provided [SRS] were precisely
the reasons that Dennehy decided to hire her,” and
that Dennehy’s contrary testimony was “not credible.” Id. at 277a.
UMass had sole responsibility for selecting and retaining medical specialists for the DOC. Pet. App. 274a.

3
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According to the en banc majority, in contrast, the
DOC retained Osborne for her “substantial expertise” in GID, Pet. App. 10a, and because the DOC believed she might “do more objective evaluations,” id.
at 9a.
Meanwhile, after evaluating Ms. Kosilek, Fenway
Health’s GID experts submitted a written report recommending that Ms. Kosilek undergo SRS and stating that, absent SRS, she would likely attempt to
harm herself again. Pet. App. 275a-276a.4 The DOC
thus faced the situation it had hoped to avoid
through its policies and strategic employment (and
termination) of specialists: a recommendation from
its own doctors that Ms. Kosilek receive SRS.
In light of this recommendation, the DOC was required by its own policies to conduct a security evaluation to determine the impact of providing SRS to
Ms. Kosilek. Pet. App. 283a. The district court
found that Dennehy met with key personnel to discuss the security evaluation for the first time on May
19, 2005. Id. But several days earlier, on May 16,
2005, Dennehy gave interviews to the media in
which she indicated that the DOC already had identified significant security concerns that would result
if Ms. Kosilek received SRS. Id. According to the
district court, at the time of the interviews, Dennehy
had not yet requested or received the required written security assessment, or met with key personnel
to obtain their views, and, thus, she could not have

Ms. Kosilek had previously attempted castration and suicide
(twice) as a result of GID. Pet. App 346a.

4
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had any basis to tell the media that SRS would present security risks. Id. at 281a-283a.5
The en banc majority, however, reached a different
factual conclusion, by crediting different record evidence. According to the majority, the DOC began
discussing security concerns in January 2005, and,
starting in April, “worked to formalize its security
concerns into a report.” Pet. App. 16a (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the majority determined that
the statements Dennehy made during the May 16,
2005 interviews were supportable. Id. at 63a n.16.
The DOC ultimately decided that SRS would create an unacceptable security risk. According to DOC
officials, they could neither transport Ms. Kosilek
safely to and from the surgery nor ensure her safety—and that of other inmates—after the procedure.
Pet. App. 292a, 323a, 325a. Accordingly, the DOC
denied Ms. Kosilek her prescribed course of treatment.
C.

Kosilek II

Ms. Kosilek challenged the DOC’s refusal to provide her with SRS, and the district court conducted a
28-day bench trial on this issue (Kosilek II) that
spanned nearly two years and multiple DOC commissioners. The district court heard testimony from
twenty-four witnesses (including several witnesses
whom the court asked to be recalled multiple times)
and reviewed 114 exhibits—more than 6,000 record
In making this finding, the district court credited Dennehy’s
deposition testimony that the first meeting occurred on May 19,
2005, and did not credit her trial testimony that some meetings
occurred earlier. Pet. App. 283a n.11.
5
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pages in all. The court heard medical testimony
from Ms. Kosilek’s five treating physicians and medical experts, from the DOC’s litigation expert, Dr.
Chester Schmidt,6 and also from Dr. Stephen Levine,7 an independent medical expert whom the court
engaged to review and assess the competing medical
testimony. Pet. App. 286a-291a. On this factual record, the district court concluded that the DOC had
violated Ms. Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment rights by
refusing to provide SRS. More specifically, the court
made the following findings:
1. The district court found that Ms. Kosilek had
a serious medical need—severe GID—and that she
“continue[d] to suffer intense mental anguish” and
would attempt suicide again if she did not receive
SRS. Pet. App. 294a-295a.
2. The district court found that SRS offered the
only adequate treatment for Ms. Kosilek’s GID. The
court concluded that “the Standards of Care continue
to describe the quality of care acceptable to prudent
professionals who treat individuals suffering from
gender identity disorders,” Pet. App. 298a, and that
the treatment plan recommended by the DOC’s expert witness, Dr. Schmidt—continued access to estrogen therapy and female clothing, plus psychotherapy—failed to comply with those standards, id. at
308a. More specifically, the court found that Dr.
The DOC retained Dr. Schmidt shortly before the deadline for
expert disclosures, on the recommendation of Osborne. Pet.
App. 284a. Like Osborne, Dr. Schmidt worked in the Johns
Hopkins psychiatry department. Id.
6

Dr. Levine was the Co-Director of the Center for Marital and
Sexual Health in Cleveland, Ohio, as well as a co-author of the
Standards of Care. Pet. App. 290a.
7
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Schmidt was not a prudent professional and that his
treatment plan “[was] not within the range of treatment that a prudent professional would prescribe.”
Id. at 311a. Instead, relying on the opinions of the
six other doctors who testified at trial—including the
DOC’s own treating clinicians and the
courtappointed independent expert—the district court
found that surgery was the only medically adequate
treatment in Ms. Kosilek’s case. Id.
3. The district court determined that the DOC
acted with deliberate indifference by denying SRS.
It concluded that DOC officials had actual knowledge
that Ms. Kosilek faced a substantial risk of harm if
she did not receive SRS. Pet. App. 313a. Among
other evidence, the court relied on Dennehy’s testimony that she accepted the DOC clinicians’ opinions
and did not dispute that Ms. Kosilek had a serious
medical need; rather, “she testified that only safety
and security concerns were preventing Kosilek from
receiving the prescribed treatment.” Id. at 315a.
4. The district court found that the DOC’s proffered security concerns were “pretextual” because
they were “not reasonable and made in good faith.”
Pet. App. 318a. Instead, it found, the DOC denied
the surgery to avoid “public and political criticism.”
Id. at 284a, 318a-319a. To support these findings,
the district court relied on evidence of Dennehy’s
long history of conduct aimed at avoiding the provision of care to transgender inmates. Among other
things, it found that Dennehy participated in the decision to terminate a physician after he recommended SRS for Ms. Kosilek, stalled treatments for Ms.
Kosilek and other transgender prisoners, and took
the “unprecedented” step of directly hiring a social
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worker who was known to oppose the provision of
SRS to inmates to peer review the report prepared by
the DOC’s own physicians. Id. at 319a-320a.
The district court also cited the manner in which
the DOC had conducted its security evaluation, finding that Dennehy had departed from written DOC
procedures, had spoken with the media before actually conducting the required review, and had failed
to consult with the DOC’s security experts before
making up her mind. Pet. App. 321a. The district
court further found that Dennehy and subsequentCommissioner Harold Clarke lacked credibility on
numerous key points. For example, the court found
incredible Dennehy’s and Clarke’s contentions that
they believed Ms. Kosilek might attempt to flee during transport to or from the surgery. Id. at 323a325a.
Though the district court was “far from anxious to
grant the [injunctive] relief sought,” Pet. App. 338a,
based on the record before it the court concluded that
the DOC had violated Ms. Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment rights, and it ordered the DOC to “take forthwith all of the actions reasonably necessary to provide Kosilek sex reassignment surgery as promptly
as possible,” id. at 344a.
D.

The Panel Decision

A three-judge panel of the First Circuit affirmed.
The panel majority explained that “the success of
Kosilek’s claim depends almost entirely on questions
of credibility (in assessing the state’s motives) and on
questions of medical care (in assessing Kosilek’s
medical needs),” Pet. App. 171a, and it reviewed
these “quintessentially factual findings” “for clear
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error only,” id. at 169a, 171a. The panel majority
noted that the district court “engaged in a careful
and close analysis of the trial evidence,” id. at 169a,
and that “there [wa]s certainly evidentiary support
for [the court’s] findings,” id. at 192a.
The DOC filed a petition for rehearing en banc,
which the First Circuit granted just twelve days later, without first calling for a response.
E.

The En Banc Decision

In a 3-2 decision, with a 71-page majority opinion
and separate dissents by Judges Thompson and
Kayatta, the First Circuit reversed the district court
on essentially all fronts.
The majority determined that the district court’s
Eighth Amendment analysis involved “a multitude of
questions that present elements both factual and legal,” and that it would review such questions under
its continuum of deference—a standard of “variable
exactitude” whereby “the more law-based a question,
the less deferential[]” the review. Pet. App. 38a-39a.
The majority then spent approximately twenty-five
pages considering the evidence anew, making its own
credibility determinations and citing the evidence
that it found most persuasive. See infra pp. 21-27
(providing examples of the First Circuit’s factfinding). Throughout these twenty-five pages, the
court did not articulate whether it considered the
district court’s determinations to be “more lawbased” or more factual in nature, nor did it articulate
the precise standard of review it was applying.
Ultimately, the majority disagreed with practically
every finding made by the district court—including
both its subsidiary and ultimate findings of fact.
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Thus, whereas the district court found (1) that SRS
was not only clinically appropriate but also medically
necessary for Ms. Kosilek, Pet. App. 233a, and (2)
that the DOC’s chosen course of treatment was medically inadequate, id. at 310a-311a, the First Circuit
determined (1) that SRS was not medically necessary
for Ms. Kosilek, and (2) that the DOC had selected
one of two alternative treatment regimens, both of
which were “reasonably commensurate with the
medical standards of prudent professionals,” id. at
53a; see also id. at 48a (stating that Dr. Schmidt’s
testimony demonstrated a “reasonable difference in
medical opinion[]”). And, while the district court
found that the security reasons proffered by the DOC
for denying SRS were “largely false,” “greatly exaggerated,” and pretextual, id. at 321a, the First Circuit determined that “[t]he DOC’s concerns about
safety and security were reasonable,” id. at 58a.
Armed with these reconstructed facts, the First Circuit held that the DOC had not violated Ms.
Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Two judges dissented. Both emphasized the same
point: the majority had wildly overstepped the
bounds of an appellate court. As Judge Thompson
stated: “Given the clearly fact-intensive nature of the
court’s review, our own examination into whether
the court was correct that the DOC violated the
Eighth Amendment should be deferential, as opposed
to the fresh look the majority proposes.” Pet. App.
76a (Thompson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 108a
(Kayatta, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if one agrees with
the majority that the district court got the factfinding wrong, we should defer unless the result is
clearly erroneous.”).
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.

The First Circuit’s Degree-Of-Deference
Continuum Is Inconsistent With This
Court’s Precedents And Conflicts With
The Standards Used In Other Circuits.

The First Circuit has created its own standard of
review for appeals involving both legal and factual
questions: a “degree-of-deference continuum” under
which it provides (unquantified) greater or lesser
deference to the district court depending on the extent to which it believes the issue decided is more legal or more factual in nature. As the en banc majority explained here:
The test for establishing an Eighth
Amendment claim of inadequate medical
care encompasses a multitude of questions
that present elements both factual and legal.
Review of such “mixed questions” is of variable exactitude; the more law-based a question, the less deferentially we assess the district court’s conclusion. In Re Extradition of
Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1328 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“The standard of review applicable to mixed
questions usually depends upon where they
fall along the degree-of-deference continuum
. . . .”).8

The en banc majority erred in labeling as “mixed questions”
all “questions that present elements both factual and legal.”
Pet. App. 39a. Instead, this Court has defined a “mixed question of law and fact” to refer simply to “the rule of law as applied to the established facts.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
8
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Pet. App. 38a-39a (alteration in original).
Application of the First Circuit’s continuum standard is not limited to this case, or even to other
Eighth Amendment cases. Instead, it applies to any
appeal in any civil case in which the district court
decided issues that have both legal and factual components. It is therefore not surprising that the First
Circuit has invoked this standard in a number of different contexts. See, e.g., Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v.
Patrick, 774 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2014) (unconstitutional abuse and neglect of children in foster care);
Braunstein, 571 F.3d at 124 (bankruptcy proceeding);
Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Star Equip. Corp., 541 F.3d
1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008) (enforceability of settlement
agreement).
A. The Degree-Of-Deference Continuum Is
Inconsistent With This Court’s
Precedents.
This Court has acknowledged that it can be difficult, at times, to determine whether a particular issue is legal or factual in nature. See, e.g., Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990)
(“The Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues.”); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)
(noting “the vexing nature of the distinction between
questions of fact and questions of law”). But it nonetheless has required courts to make such distinctions
and then to apply one of two standards of review:
clear error (to predominantly factual issues) or de
novo (to predominantly legal issues). See Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 839
(2015) (rejecting the argument that, because “sepa-
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rating ‘factual’ from ‘legal’ questions is often difficult,” appellate courts can avoid applying clear-error
review to factual findings to make things “simpler”).
This Court has never allowed courts of appeals to
apply some intermediate standard of “variable exactitude,” as the en banc majority did here.
As this Court often has cautioned, appellate courts
should not be in the business of reconsidering issues
that are fundamentally factual in nature: “[W]hen
reviewing the findings of a ‘district court sitting
without a jury, appellate courts must constantly
have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo.’” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 837 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985)). An appellate court may not reverse the
district court, sitting as trier of fact, “simply because
it is convinced that it would have decided the case
differently.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
Instead, the role of appellate courts is circumscribed: If an appellate court believes that the district court failed to consider relevant evidence, it
must remand. See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at
291-92. In order to reverse a district court’s factbased decision, an appellate court must expressly declare the district court’s finding to be clearly erroneous. See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 843 (court of appeals
erred in failing to accept the district court’s factual
finding “without finding that [it] was ‘clearly erroneous’”); Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 283 (faulting
the court of appeals for coming to a different factual
conclusion than the district court when the court of
appeals did not “expressly set aside or find clearly
erroneous” the district court’s findings). Courts may
not do what the First Circuit’s continuum standard
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effectively allowed it to do here—to reach contrary
factual conclusions without ever holding that the district court clearly erred.
Not only is the First Circuit’s continuum standard
inconsistent with this Court’s precedent, it is also inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a)(6) provides that
“[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to
the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’
credibility.” This Rule serves “the public interest in
the stability and judicial economy . . . promoted by
recognizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of facts.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
52 advisory committee’s note (1985).
The First Circuit’s degree-of-deference continuum
runs afoul of this Court’s precedents and Rule
52(a)(6). By creating and invoking a “degree-ofdeference continuum,” the First Circuit has allowed
itself to apply standards of review of “variable exactitude,” without expressly stating precisely what
standard of review is warranted, or what standard of
review it is applying. This, in turn, gives the First
Circuit free reign to do as it did here: to independently review and reweigh the trial evidence and to make
its own factual findings, without ever holding that
the district court clearly erred. This not only undermines the “unchallenged superiority of the district court’s factfinding ability,” Salve Regina Coll. v.
Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991), it also sends an
improper message to litigants that, in the First Circuit, trial on the merits is a “tryout on the road,” rather than the “main event,” Anderson, 470 U.S. at
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575 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90
(1977)).
B. The Degree-Of-Deference Continuum
Conflicts With The Standards Of Review
Applied By Other Circuit Courts.
The First Circuit stands alone in applying a sliding
scale of deference to the findings made by a district
court.
Other circuits recognize that they must
choose between clear-error and de novo review.
These circuits typically “break down [the district
court’s] conclusions into their components and apply
the appropriate standard of review to each component.” Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 539
F.3d 292, 305 (3d Cir. 2008). As explained by the
Fourth Circuit, for example: “We review mixed questions of law and fact ‘under a hybrid standard, applying to the factual portion of each inquiry the same
standard applied to questions of pure fact and examining de novo the legal conclusions derived from
those facts.’” U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Smitley, 347 F.3d 109, 116 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted); see also Diebold Found., Inc. v. Comm’r,
736 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2013) (issues are reviewed
“de novo to the extent that the alleged error is based
on the misunderstanding of a legal standard, and for
clear error to the extent that the alleged error is
based on a factual determination”); Davila v. Menendez, 717 F.3d 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 2013) (“‘We review [mixed] questions de novo to the extent they involve application of legal principles to established
facts, and for clear error to the extent they involve an
inquiry that is essentially factual.’” (citation omitted)); Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., LLC, 691 F.3d
566, 569-70 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that, where ul-
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timate findings rest on both factual and legal underpinnings, appellate courts should “review the factual
components under the clearly erroneous standard,
and the legal components de novo” (citation omitted)); Pell, 539 F.3d at 305; In re Behlke, 358 F.3d
429, 433 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Mixed questions are to be
separated into their component parts and reviewed
under the appropriate standard.”).
Even if a particular question cannot be broken
down into purely factual or purely legal components,
other circuits have recognized that they still must
choose between clear-error and de novo review. See,
e.g., Hollern v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 458 F.3d 1169,
1175 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (“mixed questions” are reviewed “under either the clearly erroneous standard
or de novo standard depending on whether the mixed
question involves primarily a factual inquiry or the
consideration of legal principles”); Krist v. Kolombos
Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) (same).9 No
Although some courts have suggested that “mixed questions”
should always receive de novo review, in such cases the term
“mixed questions” refers to questions involving the application
of the relevant legal standard to the established facts—not to
questions, like those at issue here, that include disputes about
underlying factual determinations. See, e.g., In re Green Hills
Dev. Co., LLC, 741 F.3d 651, 654-55 (5th Cir. 2014) (“To the
extent that we are presented with a mixed question of law and
fact, we consider the question de novo, although we have recognized that the ‘underlying facts’ in mixed questions should be
reviewed for clear error.”); Morales v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 295, 301
(5th Cir. 2013) (“When examining mixed questions of law and
fact, we also utilize a de novo standard by independently applying the law to the facts found by the district court, as long as
the district court’s factual determinations are not clearly erroneous.”); see also McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S.
337 (1991) (defining “mixed question[s]” as those in which “the
underlying facts are established[ ] and the rule of law is undis-

9
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court of appeals, aside from the First Circuit, applies
a standard of its own design that is neither clearerror nor de novo review.
Indeed, several circuits have expressly rejected the
notion that it is acceptable to “glue together” factual
findings and legal determinations in order “to review
the first question, the factual one, de novo.” Kaplun
v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010); accord
Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 2013).
But, as discussed below, by invoking its continuum
standard, that is precisely what the First Circuit did
here.
C. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For The
Court To Address This Critical Issue.
This case presents an ideal opportunity for this
Court to address whether issues with both factual
and legal components may be reviewed as a whole
along a continuum of deference—as the First Circuit
en banc majority held—or whether a court must instead apply clear-error or de novo review to each underlying factual or legal question, as other circuits
do. Not only is the issue squarely presented,10 but
(as the two dissenters observed) the en banc majority’s application of its continuum of deference was
outcome-determinative here. As illustrated below,
the en banc majority used the continuum approach to
reverse the district court’s purely factual findings on
puted, [and] the issue is whether the facts meet the statutory
standard”).
See Pet. App. 38a-39a (expressly declaring that en banc majority was applying the continuum standard to its review of the
“multitude” of questions underlying Ms. Kosilek’s Eighth
Amendment claim).
10

22
the central questions in this case: (1) whether SRS
was medically necessary, and (2) whether the DOC’s
purported security concerns were merely pretextual.
1. Adequacy of Medical Care:
The relevant
standard of medical care and the necessity or adequacy of a particular medical treatment are factual
issues. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S.
111, 122-23 (1979) (treating medical standard of care
as finding of historical fact); Snow v. McDaniel, 681
F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012) (“whether any option
other than surgery was medically acceptable” is a
factual issue), overruled on other grounds by Peralta
v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore ex
rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1258 (11th Cir.
2011) (“The record presents material issues of fact
over what amount of private duty nursing hours are
medically necessary for Moore, which must be resolved by a factfinder at trial.”); Moore v. Duffy, 255
F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001) (whether treatment
provided deviated from the applicable standard of
care treated as factual question).
But here, the First Circuit did not accept the district court’s findings on these factual issues, and
whatever standard of “variable exactitude” it applied
bore no resemblance to clear-error review. Instead,
the First Circuit decided de novo that SRS was not,
in fact, medically necessary for Ms. Kosilek. In so
doing, the First Circuit re-considered, re-weighed,
and drew its own factual inferences from the evidence to reverse many of the district court’s subsidiary factual findings. For example:


The district court found that “the [treatment]
approach proposed by Dr. Schmidt would not
reduce Kosilek’s suffering to the point that
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[s]he no longer had a serious medical need.”
Pet. App. 310a. “As [four other physicians]
persuasively testified, antidepressants and
psychotherapy would not eliminate Kosilek’s
distress or diminish it to the point where there
was no longer a significant risk of serious
harm.” Id. The en banc majority, ignoring
that finding completely, concluded just the opposite: “Trial testimony established that [Dr.
Schmidt’s] plan offers real and direct treatment for Kosilek’s GID. It employs methods
proven to alleviate Kosilek’s mental distress
while crafting a plan to minimize the risk of
future harm.” Id. at 52a-53a.11


The district court found that “Osborne’s
known positions and foreseeable advice that
Kosilek should not be provided [SRS] were
precisely the reasons that Dennehy decided to
hire her.” Pet. App. 277a. The en banc majority ignored that finding and instead stated
that the DOC retained Osborne because of her
“substantial expertise,” id. at 10a, and because
she “may do more objective evaluations,” id. at
9a. The majority went on to state that the
DOC did not seek out a specific doctor willing
to support its desired outcome but, rather,

11 The First Circuit’s reliance on Dr. Schmidt’s testimony was
misplaced not only because the district court had discredited it,
but also because Dr. Schmidt was merely a trial expert for the
DOC, and his post-hoc medical opinion did not enter into the
DOC’s decisionmaking process at the time the DOC denied SRS
for Ms. Kosilek. Indeed, as the en banc majority itself noted,
albeit in a footnote, the DOC did not even argue that its denial
was based on or justified by the existence of “conflicting medical
opinions.” Pet. App. 55a n.13.
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that the DOC made a reasonable and “considered decision to seek out a second opinion.”
Id. at 54a n.12.


The district court found that Ms. Kosilek had
met the prerequisites for SRS set forth in the
Standards of Care, explaining that “the prison
environment has provided Kosilek with an
even more stringent ‘real life experience’ test
than many transsexuals have outside prison,
because inmates are constantly under observation and any failure to live as a woman
would be readily noted.” Pet. App. 309a.12
The en banc majority, without reference to the
clear error standard, simply reached a contrary factual conclusion: “Dr. Levine noted that
an incarcerative environment might well be
insufficient to expose Kosilek to the variety of
societal, familial, and vocational pressures
foreseen by a real-life experience. This viewpoint aligned with that of Dr. Schmidt and
Osborne.” Id. at 49a.

2. Pretext: Scienter-based findings such as discriminatory intent and pretext are uniformly considered factual and, thus, subject to clear-error review.
See, e.g., Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287-88 (discriminatory intent); Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
128 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1997) (determination of
pretext); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 706 (2nd
Cir. 1994) (findings of discrimination, discriminatory
intent, and pretext); United States v. Knight, 342
See also Pet. App. 301a (“For someone like Kosilek who is
serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, prison is, and always will be, h[er] real life.”).
12
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F.3d 697, 713 (7th Cir. 2003) (whether reason given
for striking juror was pretextual).
But here, the First Circuit gave no indication that
it considered the district court’s finding of pretext to
be factual in nature, and its review of the court’s
subsidiary and ultimate findings on this issue went
far beyond clear-error review: Although the district
court found that the DOC’s asserted security concerns were “largely false and . . . greatly exaggerated,” Pet. App. 321a, the First Circuit independently
considered and re-weighed the evidence, downplayed
testimony on which the district court relied, and emphasized other testimony that supported its own conclusion that the DOC’s proffered concerns were reasonable and valid, id. at 58a-61a. For example:


The district court did not credit the proffered
concern that SRS would present a risk of violence within the prison, noting that Ms.
Kosilek “has been living at MCI Norfolk with
breasts, long hair, makeup, and feminine
clothes for many years,” which “has not provoked any assaults or created any other problems.” Pet. App. 327a. In light of that history,
and the factual inferences that may properly
be drawn therefrom, the district court found
that “neither Dennehy nor Clarke . . . provided
a credible explanation for their purported belief” that SRS would magnify the risk of violence. Id. at 328a. The First Circuit simply
disagreed, drawing its own factual inferences,
and making its own factual findings about the
reasonableness of Dennehy’s and Clarke’s testimony: “[T]hat Kosilek had so far been safe
within MCI-Norfolk’s prison population does
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not negate the DOC’s well-reasoned belief that
safety concerns would arise in the future after
SRS.” Id. at 59a.


The district court found that DOC officials refused to even explore the option of interstate
transfer to address the DOC’s purported concern that Ms. Kosilek’s SRS might prove too
“disrupt[ive]” to the “climate” of MCI Norfolk
(where Ms. Kosilek was incarcerated) or MCI
Framingham (the state’s women’s prison).
Pet. App. 327a-328a. The en banc majority ignored this finding, relying on and emphasizing
different evidence in the record to suggest that
the refusal to rely on interstate transfer was a
calculated, rational decision by DOC officials.
See id. at 31a, 33a.



The district court found that, at the time
Dennehy gave media interviews suggesting
that SRS would raise security reasons, the
DOC had not yet conducted the security review required by DOC procedures and had not
had any discussions regarding these concerns
with key DOC personnel. Pet. App. 280a283a. This finding was based on the district
court’s express witness credibility determination. Id. at 283a n.11. But the First Circuit,
upon its own review of the record, found that
Dennehy had discussed security concerns with
key personnel at meetings between January
and April 2005, and started to formalize the
DOC’s findings into a report in April 2005. Id.
at 16a.



Notwithstanding the district court’s express
finding that Dennehy’s and Clarke’s claims
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that security considerations motivated their
decisions to deny SRS were “largely false” and
“greatly exaggerated,” Pet App. 321a, the en
banc majority stated that “Clarke was never
found . . . to be noncredible,” id. at 65a.
Because the First Circuit did not, and could not,
declare the district court’s findings on these credibility issues clearly erroneous, the outcome of its review
necessarily would have been different had it applied
the appropriate standard.
Finally, this case is an ideal vehicle because it illustrates perfectly the problem with the First Circuit’s novel standard of review. As Judge Thompson
aptly observed, the en banc majority “formulate[d] a
standard of review that, though articulated as one of
variable exactitude, amounts to sweeping de novo
review.” Pet. App. 67a (Thompson, J., dissenting).
By invoking the continuum of deference, and then
never precisely articulating what standard of review
it was applying, the en banc majority allowed itself to
reweigh the evidence and reach the conclusion it preferred. And that is precisely what this Court has
held that appellate courts cannot do. See PullmanStandard, 456 U.S. at 291-92; Anderson, 470 U.S. at
573-74.
D. In The Alternative To Granting
Certiorari, This Court May Vacate In
Light Of Teva v. Sandoz Or Issue A
Summary Reversal.
This Court has, on several occasions, granted certiorari and issued an opinion correcting an appellate
court’s erroneous articulation or application of the
relevant standards of review. See, e.g., Anderson,
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470 U.S. at 566 (granting certiorari and reversing
where “the Court of Appeals misapprehended and
misapplied the clearly-erroneous standard”); Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 290-91 (1982) (granting
certiorari and reversing where, “although the Court
of Appeals acknowledged and correctly stated the
controlling standard of Rule 52(a),” the appellate
court erroneously applied that standard). This Court
also has granted certiorari to correct an appellate
court’s failure to apply the clear-error standard
where its application is required. See, e.g., Teva, 135
S. Ct. at 835 (factual findings underlying claim construction). Thus, granting certiorari would be an appropriate way to address the First Circuit’s improper
degree-of-deference continuum.
Nevertheless, this Court also may resolve this case
by granting, vacating, and remanding in light of
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
831 (2015). In Teva, this Court made clear that (1) a
district court’s resolution of factual disputes underlying its legal conclusions is subject to clear-error review, id. at 835, and (2) courts of appeals may not
disregard district court findings without declaring
them to be clearly erroneous, id. at 843. The First
Circuit’s decision, which was issued before Teva, violates both of these precepts. Accordingly, this Court
may properly vacate the First Circuit’s judgment and
remand for reconsideration pursuant to the standard-of-review principles set forth in Teva.
Alternatively, the Court could resolve this case via
summary reversal, as it has done in other recent cases involving an appellate court’s gross misapplication
of Supreme Court precedent concerning the appropriate legal standard. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus,
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551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam summary reversal on
pleading standard); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861
(2014) (per curiam summary reversal on summary
judgment standard). As explained above, many of
the findings made by the district court and disregarded or implicitly reversed by the First Circuit are
precisely the types of findings that this Court already has suggested should be reviewed for clear error. See supra pp. 21-27. Whatever standard the en
banc majority applied within its continuum of deference, that standard bore no similarity to clear-error
review, and in no instance did the court determine
that the district court’s findings on these issues were
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, if this Court is not
inclined to grant certiorari to address the “degree-ofdeference continuum,” it can instead summarily reverse the decision below.
II.

The First Circuit’s Rule That Prison
Officials May Constitutionally Deny
Medical Care For Non-Medical Reasons Is
Inconsistent With This Court’s
Jurisprudence And The Holdings Of
Other Circuits.

The en banc majority held that a denial of adequate medical care will not violate the Eighth
Amendment so long as prison officials can cite a nonmedical justification for denying treatment—in this
case, a security concern—that is “within the realm of
reason.” See Pet. App. 58a; see also id. at 38a
(“[E]ven a denial of care may not amount to an
Eighth Amendment violation if that decision is based
in legitimate concerns regarding prison safety and
institutional security.”). Citing its own precedent,
the majority stated that “[w]hen evaluating medical
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care and deliberate indifference, security considerations inherent in the functioning of a penological institution must be given significant weight.” Id. (citing Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir.
2011)). The majority’s holding is inconsistent with
the Eighth Amendment principles articulated by this
Court and with the holdings of several other circuits.
A. The First Circuit’s Holding Is Inconsistent
With This Court’s Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence.
As this Court recently explained in Brown v. Plata,
“[a] prison that deprives prisoners of . . . adequate
medical care[] is incompatible with the concept of
human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). Because “[a]n inmate
must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical
needs,” the Eighth Amendment imposes an obligation on state officials “to provide medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); see also Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1970) (“[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate . . .
medical care . . . .”). This duty, and consequently the
Eighth Amendment, is violated whenever an inmate
has a serious medical need and a prison official
knowingly fails to respond to it with medically adequate care, whether or not that failure is malicious.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36, 842; Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104-05. This Court has prescribed no other
requirement—such as the lack of a countervailing
security concern—to prove an Eighth Amendment
claim.
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The First Circuit’s rule that security concerns can
save the state from an otherwise-established Eighth
Amendment violation ignores that prisoner safety
and security is an additional duty imposed by the
Eighth Amendment, not an alternative one. As this
Court stated in Farmer, “prison officials must ensure
that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”
511 U.S. at 832 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
But under the First Circuit’s holding, prison officials
faced with any medical treatment that implicates security concerns—e.g., offsite treatments that pose a
risk of prisoner escape, or the provision of necessary
medical equipment that could be used as a weapon—
can simply choose between their constitutional duties, electing to provide adequate medical treatment
or ensure prisoner safety. Such a holding has no basis in this Court’s jurisprudence.
In the decision below, the en banc majority relied
on First and Fourth Amendment cases in which this
Court balanced inmates’ constitutional rights against
prison officials’ need to ensure institutional security
and internal order. Pet. App. 59a. But these cases
are inapposite, because First and Fourth Amendment rights are not absolute. See Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984) (holding that “the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches
does not apply in prison cells” because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in prison); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501
(1981) (First Amendment rights “at times . . . must
yield to other societal interests”); see also Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (“[T]he prohibition
on encroachment of First Amendment protections is
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not an absolute. Restraints are permitted for appropriate reasons.”). And, while “certain privileges and
rights must necessarily be limited in the prison context,” the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment is not among them, because “the integrity of the criminal justice system depends on full
compliance with the Eighth Amendment.” Johnson
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510-11 (2005).13
B. The First Circuit’s Holding Is Inconsistent
With The Holdings Of Other Circuits.
The First Circuit’s holding is inconsistent with the
prevailing rule in other circuits, which have held, in
a number of contexts, that medical care cannot be
denied “for non-medical reasons.” Ancata v. Prison
Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.
1985) (“[I]f necessary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate
indifference has been made out.”); see also Durmer v.
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]f the
failure to provide adequate care in the form of physical therapy was deliberate, and motivated by nonmedical factors, then Durmer has a viable claim.”
(emphasis added)).

If non-medical considerations could be considered at all—and
they should not be—the court should subject such justifications
to strict scrutiny, rather than the “wide-ranging deference” that
the First Circuit afforded to the DOC’s proffered security concerns. Pet. App. 57a. “[M]echanical deference to the findings of
state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment
would reduce that provision to a nullity in precisely the context
where it is most necessary.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189,
193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.), quoted in Johnson, 543
U.S. at 511.

13
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Other circuits repeatedly have held, for example,
that prison officials cannot refuse medical treatment
to avoid administrative burdens or expenses. See,
e.g., Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 862-63 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[T]he Constitution is violated when [administrative convenience and cost] are considered to the
exclusion of reasonable medical judgment about inmate health.” (emphasis omitted)); Johnson v.
Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The
cost of treatment alternatives” cannot justify the selection of an “easier course of treatment that [officials] know is ineffective.”); Durmer, 991 F.2d at 6869 (holding Eighth Amendment claim viable where
factfinder could have concluded that prison officials
failed to provide physical therapy after a stroke to
avoid “considerable burden and expense on the prison”); Ancata, 769 F.2d at 705 (“Lack of funds for facilities cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of
competent medical care and treatment for inmates.”);
see also Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“Lack of resources is not a defense to a
claim for prospective relief . . . .”).
Several circuit courts also have held that practical
constraints, such as overcrowding or understaffing,
cannot justify the delay or denial of medical care under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762-63 (3d
Cir. 1979) (discussing staffing deficiencies); Wellman
v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272-74 (7th Cir. 1983) (inadequate medical care caused by staffing deficiencies
and overcrowding demonstrates Eighth Amendment
violation).
The First Circuit’s rule, which permits prison officials to deny necessary medical treatment for rea-
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sons that have nothing whatsoever to do with medical need, stands in stark contrast to these decisions
and creates a circuit split that only this Court can
resolve.
C. This Question Presents An Issue Of Critical
Importance.
Recent cases have demonstrated the practical constraints imposed on prison officials by increasing
prison populations and budget cuts. See, e.g., Brown,
131 S. Ct. 1910; Peralta, 744 F.3d 1076. Given these
increasing pressures, courts are likely to see more
and more cases involving prison officials’ reliance on
non-medical considerations, such as cost, administrative convenience, and security, to justify the denial of medical treatment. Until this Court makes
clear that security and other non-medical concerns
cannot justify a denial of adequate medical care, the
duty articulated by this Court decades ago in Farmer
v. Brennan will remain toothless—at least in the
First Circuit.
D. This Case Presents An Appropriate Vehicle
For This Court To Reach This Question.
This issue is squarely presented, was reached by
the court below, and was central to the First Circuit’s
conclusion. It is thus appropriately presented for
this Court’s review.14

Although this issue alone is not dispositive, if the Court vacates and remands on the first question presented in this petition, then resolving this question will help to narrow the scope
of the issues that the First Circuit must reconsider under the
proper standard of review.

14
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
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